Investigations of Electronic FX Trading Continue

Reuters reports that the New York Department of Financial Services (NYDFS) investigation of several money center banks for FX rate manipulation on electronic trading platforms is continuing. They report that NYDFS has interviewed dozens of traders and executives at Barclay's, Deutche Bank and Credit Suisse among other banks (NYDFS has its strongest remit with foreign banks) over the past several months. Subpoenas have also been sent to BNP, Goldman Sachs and Societe Generale according to Reuters sources.

NYDFS has already been known to be investigating FX algorithms on these platforms at the banks to determine if there is an attempt by the banks to advantage themselves at their clients' expense during the time between a rate being posted and then being accepted by a client. The concern is that this period may be used to front run client orders or otherwise manipulate FX rates. Earlier bank settlements with regulators covered spot market trading, but NYDFS agreements particularly, did not cover electronic trading. The Department of justice is also investigating FX electronic trading.

No information is available on how these investigations will play out against the various banks involved. The fact that they continue and appear to have widened from initial reports limited to Barclay's and Deutche, may indicate that regulators have found potential issues worthy of investigation, but do not provide clues as to the outcome.

FSB Updates FX Benchmark Progress

The Financial Stability Board (FSB), created in 2009 by the G20 to reform international financial regulation, includes as part of its mandate a role in standard setting and in promoting members’ implementation of international standards. In September 2014 it issued a report highlighting recommended solutions to prevent a repeat of the FX benchmark scandal. Today it released an update to look at progress made since that report.

The update is fairly positive ("having moved the market in a favourable direction"), highlighting improvements, but also mentioning areas where it believes that more work needs to be done.

The points made include:
1) There have been useful reforms in the methodology used in the WM Reuters (WMR) fix but that more can do done, and mentions certain central banks adjusting their fix methodologies as well. The FSB reiterates that all fixes need to be reviewed, not just the WMR fix.

2) "Recommendations suggested to increase transparency in pricing for fix transactions have seen good implementation among the largest market participants and for the most used benchmarks, but that elsewhere there is scope for further improvement".

3) "Steps to separate dealers’ fixings business from other activities are being taken by the larger participants and in the most active markets, but again there is room for further implementation in other areas of the FX market. For the execution of benchmark transactions, industry-led initiatives to promote greater use of independent netting and execution facilities are seeing welcome progress".

4) "Work is underway to improve market conduct practices, both within individual firms and through market-wide initiatives, including the global effort underway to develop a single code of conduct for the foreign exchange market through the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Markets Committee working group on FX markets".

5) "While many index providers and end-users have increased their focus on the due diligence around FX benchmark use, there is scope for greater follow-through on this on the part of some market participants".

All in all, it appears that while some additional fix changes may be seen, for the most part fix reform will primarily involve broadening the changes already made to cover additional fixes and additional market participants. The probable exception will be the new international code of conduct being created by the BIS. This will replace the many different codes currently in force in markets around the world and will impact bank behavior.

FX Scandal Not Blowing Away

First of all, the rest of the world is looking at the US class action suit in which over $2 billion in settlements have already been made by 9 large banks, and lawyers and investors are planning additional suits in several countries. A $1 billion suit has just been filed in Canada relating to benchmark currency fixes.

Secondly, a Citi FX trader who had been dismissed in the UK relating to his sharing of client information with FX traders from other banks on chat rooms, is fighting his dismissal. He is claiming that it was a market practice at the time to share such information, especially regarding the trading of central banks. He mentions one M&A deal in which Citi front run the client's trade and made a profit of $35 million. He states that the very top Citi FX management actually had a hand in this deal.

There are other FX traders who were dismissed relating to similar charges who are also planning on disputing their firings.

FX Investigations Widen Beyond WM Fix

When Bloomberg's initial story hit the wires in June 2013, the allegations, later confirmed to be true, were primarily limited to banks manipulating the WM benchmark rates. Since then regulators in the US, UK and Switzerland have instituted over $10 billion in fines on major banks related to FX, and in many cases, banks have acknowledged criminal wrongdoing. These fines related primarily to collusion by the banks in attempting to manipulate the fix, on the back of transcripts of chat room conversations by bank FX traders that clearly showed their collusion and attempts to profit at the expense of market participants. (For other wrongdoings acknowledged in bank settlements earlier this year, please see our blog post from June 1, 2015, FX Bank Settlements — More Misconduct than the Fix)

These regulatory and criminal matters relating to the fix are at least partially behind us now (individual traders and local emerging market fixes remain under scrutiny), although a class action civil lawsuit in the US related to these same matters is ongoing, with 9 banks having settled so far. In addition, law firms around the world are reported to be attempting to institute civil lawsuits in other jurisdictions as well, particularly in the UK. There, in the largest FX market in the world, new laws as of October 1 will allow suits similar to class action suits in the US (and will allow non-UK residents to participate). With over $2 billion in settlements to date in the US (with 7 banks remaining in the suit), there may be several billion pounds of additional settlements in the UK. Regulators in Australia, South Africa, Brazil and South Korea (and possibly others) are investigating benchmark rate rigging as well.

Banks fined by regulators and those settling the US class action have agreed to cooperate with regulators and the parties bringing the suit. Lawyers from the suit are reported to have said that evidence from the cooperation in the US points to bank manipulation of the bid-offer spread on currency trades through the rest of the day, not having to do with the fix. How this may have been done is not clear, but if true would dramatically increase the scope of bank wrongdoing. It would mean that the rates on many more trades are not entirely market driven and all such trades would have the bank gaining at client expense, while the benchmark manipulation had some clients gaining and some losing from each manipulated rate.

Until more information is released it is hard to know if there was additional rate-rigging in FX markets. Should it be shown to have occurred, a further move toward exchange-type trading should be expected, as well as further criminal prosecutions and civil suits. Bank traders and investors beware.

FX Manipulation Class Action Spreads to more Banks in US, Possibly Around the World

It is now reported by Reuters that four additional banks, HSBC, Barclays, BNP Paribas and Goldman Sachs, have agreed to settle the US FX benchmark manipulation class action suit. In addition to bank settlements announced previously, this brings total settlements over $2 billion. Individual bank settlement amounts have not yet been announced. These banks plus five banks that settled previously have all agreed to "substantial cooperation" against the remaining 7 bank defendants, including recently added defendants (Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, RBC Capital Markets, Société Générale and Standard Chartered were added August 1). Counsel referred to these settlements as "just the beginning" and mentioned that they are consulting on bringing additional cases against banks in larger Asian and European markets.

Citi says FX Fines 2,500 Times the Illicit Profits

Bloomberg reports that "Jamie Forese, head of the Citigroup Inc. unit that houses trading and investment banking, said fines the firm paid for rigging foreign-exchange markets dwarfed the amount generated by the illegal conduct. Revenue from the trades amounted to about $1 million, while Citigroup paid out $2.5 billion in fines and penalties, Forese estimated Wednesday at an investor conference in New York."

Among commentators, and regulators as well, there has been a question regarding whether the size of fines in recent settlements have been painful enough to cause banks to prevent further occurrences of misconduct. Some suggest yes, many no, but without knowing the profits generated by misconduct, it is a difficult question to answer.

If this represents Citi's answer to the discussion, we suggest that it is incomplete. While the article does not mention how the 1 million dollar gain was calculated, perhaps it was strictly based upon the specific trades uncovered in the investigations, such as the trades highlighted in the CFTC - Citi settlement. However, the settlement states that "From 2009 through 2012 (“Relevant Period”), Citibank, by and through certain of its
foreign exchange (“FX”) traders, at times sought to benefit its own trading positions or those of certain FX traders at other banks by attempting to manipulate and aiding and abetting certain traders at other banks in their attempts to manipulate certain FX benchmark rates." So the plea is to misconduct at the fixes for 4 years.

In the DOJ settlement Citi pleads to having "entered into and engaged in a conspiracy to fix, stabilize, maintain, increase or decrease the price of, and rig bids and offers for, the EUR/USD currency pair exchanged in the FX Spot Market by agreeing to eliminate competition in the purchase and sale of the EUR/USD currency pair in the United States and elsewhere. The defendant, through one of its EUR/USD traders, participated in the conspiracy from at least as early as December 2007 and continuing until at least January 2013." Here the plea is to manipulating the EUR/USD pair for a period of 5 years, but not limited to only the fixing of benchmark rates.

If 5 years of misconduct in EUR/USD (DOJ) or 4 years in various currencies at benchmark fixes (CFTC) only lead to a 1 million dollar gain, it would lead one to question how Citi made about $2 billion in revenue per year in FX during this period. Thus we question not only if the fine was truly 2,500 times the size of the misbehavior, but whether such misbehavior was limited to about one-hundredth of one percent of FX revenues ($1 million / $10 billion).

FX Bank Settlements — More Misconduct than the Fix

Another day, another FX settlement. What’s new? Well, actually a lot. The recent settlements, when you dig into them, provide a whole new array of material. First we will explore the background, and then we’ll get you to the new…

The latest settlements between FX banks and regulators were filed on May 20. Five banks agreed to pay approximately $5.6 billion in fines to US and UK regulators relating to the rigging of FX rates, including several fix benchmark rates. JPMorgan, Citi, Barclays and RBS plead guilty to criminal charges for having “entered into and engaged in a combination and conspiracy to fix, stabilize, maintain, increase or decrease the price of, and rig bids and offers … in the foreign currency exchange spot market.” UBS avoided a guilty plea, and was only fined for breaking a prior non-prosecution agreement relating to LIBOR misconduct, as a reward for being the first to inform regulators of these FX activities.

A Bloomberg news story in June 2013 provided the initial public information that there was a potential problem with FX benchmark fixes, particularly the WM Reuters London Fix. Since then numerous news stories and the November 2014 settlements with the CFTC, OCC, FCA (UK regulator) and FINMA (Swiss regulator) have described the communications between bankers at several major banks, conniving to rig FX benchmark rates -- including their use of group chats to share information on the fix trades that they would need to execute. These traders would communicate each other’s currency positions and customer orders for the upcoming fix and then determine the means to trade off of this information so that the banks could make profits at the expense of their customers. Some of the settlements provide examples of chat room conversations in which traders from multiple banks collude to manipulate the fix.

This collusion at the London Fix is the focus of news reports and the regulators’ settlements with banks for good reason: fix trading constitutes a major portion of daily FX spot trading; fix rates are used world-wide to price many widely-held assets including mutual and pension funds; collusion is illegal and easily shown to have occurred based upon chat room communications; and the names of the chatrooms (e.g., the Cartel, the Mafia), and the lingo used within, make for entertaining media.

NEW REVELATIONS
New areas of misbehavior are revealed in the new set of settlements and pleas. There is much less awareness of these than the fix-specific misconduct, so we’d like to underscore some of this behavior.
This time around, the New York State Department of Financial Services (NY DFS) gets in on the act as well, tagging Barclays with a Consent Order. The NY DFS sheds light on some areas that are not covered in other plea agreements or settlements. For example, it stipulates that “Barclays conspired with other banks in order to coordinate trading … coordinate bid/ask spreads charged.”i
The DFS also highlights Barclays’ “misleading sales practices”ii, as well as the fact that “The misconduct described in this Order was not confined to a small group of individuals; it involved more than a dozen employees, who acted with the knowledge and oversight of some senior desk managers, and spanned geographically across numerous countries.”iii Moreover, the DoJ and DFS agreements include broader time ranges of misconduct than some of the earlier settlements, such as the CFTC’s.iv
So…what other wrongdoings were these FX trading engaged in?

MANIPULATION of SPOT MARKET to PROFIT from CLIENT ORDERS
Clients leave orders with their FX banks to execute FX spot trades, in order to manage their risks from future spot moves.
Banks have admitted to manipulating FX rates when near the order levels, in order to increase the banks’ profit at the customer’s expense. For example, banks admitted to “accepting limit orders from customers and then informing those customers that their orders could not be filled … when in fact the defendant was able to fill the order but decided not to do so because the defendant expected it would be more profitable not to do so….”v
Likewise, NY DFS notes that Barclays told “clients that their orders had been only partially filled, when in fact the FX Sales employees were holding back a portion of the fill as the market moved in Barclays’ favor….”vi

PROVIDING QUOTES with DEALER MARKUP to CLIENTS EXPECTING to HEAR “DIRECT TRADER QUOTES”
On large trades, some clients insist on hearing quotes not from their salesperson (who might add a spread to a trader quote), but directly from the bank trader over a phone line. Clients would expect these to be market-based -- and not shaded in one direction based upon the direction of the client’s intended trade. However, bank traders shaded the quotes either based upon hand signals from the salesperson indicating the direction and the size of the markup to include, or based upon earlier agreements made between the two bank employees.
On this count, banks admitted to “including sales markup, through the use of live hand signals or undisclosed prior internal arrangements or communications, to prices given to customers that communicated with sales staff on open phone lines….” vii

DISCLOSURE of CUSTOMER IDENTITIES and TRADE ACTIVITY to OTHER MARKET PARTICIPANTS
Banks provided this information to other banks and even other customers, on both large fix and non-fix trades. According to the plea agreements, the banks disclosed “non-public information regarding the identity and trading activity of the defendant’s customers to other banks or other market participants….”viii

TRADE PLATFORM PROVIDED ALTERED RATES to CERTAIN CUSTOMERS
The settlements were unclear on the relationship between the platforms and the bank, but platform rates provided to certain customers were systematically favorable to the bank versus the unaltered rates. RBS engaged in “intentionally altering the rates provided to certain of its customers transacting FX over a trading platform disclosed to the United States in order to generate rates that were systematically more favorable to the defendant and less favorable to customers….”ix

TRADING AHEAD of a CORPORATE TRANSACTION
We find a new anecdote of RBS trying to move the currency rate ahead of a corporate transaction so as to favor the bank at the client’s expense. This is commonly known as front running.
From the plea agreement: “… in connection with the FX component of a single corporate transaction, trading ahead of a client transaction so as to artificially affect the price of a currency pair and generate revenue for the defendant, and to affect or attempt to affect FX rates, and in addition misrepresenting market conditions and trading to the client….”x

MANIPULATION of EMERGING MARKETS CURRENCY PRICING
“Barclays FX traders exchanged information about customer orders with FX traders at other banks…”xi For example, “a Barclays FX trader explicitly discussed with a JP Morgan trader coordinating the prices offered for USD/South African Rand to a particular customer, stating, … ‘if you win this we should coordinate you can show a real low one and will still mark it little lower haha.’”xii

CONCLUSION
These regulatory investigations have uncovered several different means used by traders to increase bank profits to the detriment of their customers, including by “providing false and misleading information to customers and markets.”xiii
As opposed to the FX market convention of adding a spread on each trade to generate bank profit (controllable by customer scrutiny of the rates), these investigations opened the window to the various layers of deceptive practices prevalent in the FX market, and the abuse of client confidentiality and trust. While the FX market has begun adjusting to the misconduct around the 4pm WM/R London fix, it is not yet clear whether clients have yet begun reacting to the newly highlighted misbehavior.
One additional feature of these settlements is the demand by regulators for additional compliance scrutiny of FX trading which will hopefully limit potential future misconduct. At FinancialPests we expect these settlements to lead the FX market toward our goal of Promoting Ethics Simplicity and Transparency.


i NY DFS Consent Order, In the Matter of: Barclays Bank PLC, p.1
ii NY DFS Consent Order, In the Matter of: Barclays Bank PLC, p.2
iii NY DFS Consent Order, In the Matter of: Barclays Bank PLC, p.6 ¶14
iv FCA “Relevant Period”: 1/1/2008 – 10/15/2013; CFTC “Relevant Period”: 2009 – 2012; FINMA “Period under Investigation”: 1/1/2008 – 9/30/2013; OCC “Relevant Period”: 2008 – 2013; Fed “Review Period”: 2008 – 2013; DoJ: 1/1/2008 and 1/1/2009 – 5/20/2015
v See for example: Plea Agreement USA vs JPMorgan Chase & Co. p.17 ¶13
vi NY DFS Consent Order, In the Matter of: Barclays Bank PLC, p.16 ¶ 56
vii See for example: Plea Agreement USA vs Citicorp p.16 ¶13
viii See for example: Plea Agreement USA vs Barclays PLC p.18 ¶16
ix Plea Agreement USA vs The Royal Bank of Scotland PLC p.17 ¶13
x Plea Agreement USA vs The Royal Bank of Scotland PLC p.17 ¶13
xi NY DFS Consent Order, In the Matter of: Barclays Bank PLC, p.11¶33
xii NY DFS Consent Order, In the Matter of: Barclays Bank PLC, p.11 ¶34
xiii NY DFS Consent Order, In the Matter of: Barclays Bank PLC, p.2