This Bloomberg article discusses how the FX market at the fix is changing in light of the allegations about collusion by large banks at the London close fix. Fewer asset managers, the largest fix customers, are trading at the fix and Bloomberg review of currency moves at the fix shows much lower volatility in the second half of 2013, after the allegations were published. Possible explanations for the lower volatility are discussed, from banks no longer colluding, lower currency volatility in general during this period, to changes at banks (new internal bank trading rules, new traders replacing those suspended or fired or banks covering their risk over a longer time period rather than right near the fix).
Perhaps most importantly, if volumes at the fix remain reduced, there is less inherent conflict. Customers trying to trade at a price to be set in the future, create the opposite incentive structure customers normally expect from their banks. On a large non-fix trade, customers typically value, and thus pay for the service of, a bank that can execute the trade with the least market movement. In a fix trade, with no bid-offer spread income available to pay the bank for its services, banks seem to have an incentive to create the most volatility possible at the fix to generate income. Although there is no proof that banks engaged in such behavior, eliminating the incentives to do so will decrease the mistrust of bank traders by customers and will PEST (Promote Ethics Simplicity and Transparency) in the foreign exchange market.
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-27/london-afternoon-currency-spikes-subside-under-regulators-glare.html
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